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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 01/08/2006

Accident number: 426

Accident time: 08:25

Accident Date: 03/07/2003

Where it occurred: Mowbr Al-Basara Army
Supply Base, Basra
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Iraq
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Demolition accident

Date of main report: 10/07/2003

ID original source: [Name removed]

Name of source: [Name removed]

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Propellant

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 29/07/2006

Date last modified: 01/08/2006

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: Long 47, 43', 35"

Map north: North Lat 30,26', 22"

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inconsistent statements (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate communications (?)

Accident report
An internal report of the accident was made available in 2005. The following reproduces the
content with names and identifiers removed.
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PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT
Incident:
On the morning 3rd July 2003. [Name excised] a Team Leader and Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) Supervisor for [the Demining group] was taking part in a clearance operation
with [Name excised 2] and members of [the Demining group] EOD/Demining team at Mowbr
Al-Basara Army Supply Base North Lat 30,26’, 22” and East Long 47, 43’, 35”.
The task was assigned to [the Demining group] by the UN Mine Action Service, which was a
under ground bunker with a large number of various calibre projectiles stored inside. To
complicate matters, local people have entered the bunker in search of packing crates.
Because of this, ordnance was strewn around the bunker. The locals also opened most of the
projectiles shells and poured out the propellant on the ground, up to ankle deep through out
the bunker.
The propellant was determined to be the most immediate problem. In order to safely access
the rest of the ordnance in the bunker. [The victim] was tasked with the removal and
destruction the propellant. And [Name excised 2] would continue to supervise the operations
inside the bunker. A burn area was located 600m east of the bunker task site at Lat 30, 26’,
40” Long 47, 43’, 47” a dirt berm with three enclosed sides. [The victim] had burned twice
before during the morning. An hour and half after the last burn [The victim] set up for the final
burn of the day. After laying out the propellant to be burned. [The victim] sent the men helping
him back to a safe area. He then started to lay out his burn train leading into the main
propellant body, when he felt heat on the back of his arms and neck. He then ran for cover,
but not before receiving 1st degree burns to the back of his arms, neck and both ears.
The medics were dispatched by radio, once the area was safe. [Medical doctor 1] reached
[The victim] first. He discovered [The victim] had burns to the back of his body but was in little
discomfort. He cut off the T- shirt and started to administer 1st Aid to the injuries. Then [The
victim] was moved to the teams support area for further observation and treatment.
About this time [the Victim] was entering the task site, when he observed the fireball and the
frantic radio traffic coming from the burn site stating there had been an accident involving
[The victim]. [Name excised 2] called [Name excised 3 – the victim of incident 429] who then
proceeded to the support site. He met up with [The victim] and [Medical doctor 1]. At this time
[The victim] was starting to feel a little discomfort. [Medical doctor 1] discussed the situation
with [Name excised 3] and [Name excised 2], and it was decided that [The victim] should be
removed to the [the Demining group] office at Basra UN office. There he could get cleaned up
in a cleaner and cool environment. So [The victim] was place in the ambulance and headed
into [the Demining group] office with [Name excised 3] following in a Land Rover.
During this time [Name excised 2] shut down the task site. Which would have had to be done
anyway, because the one trauma bag left with [Medical doctor 1] and [The victim]. So [Name
excised 2] packed the team equipment and men and departed the area for the day.
Once back at [the Demining group] office, [The victim] was looked at more closely by [Medical
doctor 1] and he now had a growing for concern about the burns around the ears. During this
time [Name excised 3] made contact with myself [Demining group Location Manager] at the
UNMAS officer and advised me about the situation. We both immediately returned to [the
Demining group] Office. There it was noted that [The victim] was in a great deal of pain now.
And it was decided to have him taken to the British Military Hospital (BMH). [Name excised 3]
then went to the UN radio room to activate the Immediate Response Team (IRT) Blue light
response time. Here it was discovered that the radio operator on duty was not familiar with
the activation procedures of the IRT. And in the end [Name excised 3] departed the radio
room without the activation of the IRT.
After the administration of a morphine injection to help with the pain [The victim] was
transported along with [Medical doctor 1] and [Medical Doctor 2] by [Name excised 3] to the
BMH. Were he was admitted for treatment where it was determined that he had received 4%,
1st degree burns to the back of his arms, his neck and both ear lobes.
Salient Facts:
The following are salient facts involved with this incident:
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1) During the time of the last burn, the temperature was extremely warm, in the high 40s with
a wind blowing across the burn pit.
2) Propellant had been sitting out in the elements for a long period of time and had become
unstable.
3) The burn had been used on two previous burns earlier in the morning.

Conclusions & Recommendations:
The following are conclusion and recommendations:
Conclusions:
1) The environment was a contributing factor. The hot weather and wind produced the right
conditions for static electricity. Where an errant spark could light the propellant prematurely.
2) The propellant has been exposed to the environmental extremes, making it unstable and
sensitive to the surrounding conditions and external forces such as friction and shock.
3) The ground being used for a previous burn operation that morning may have not had
sufficient time to cool. And when the sensitive propellant was placed on this ground, it caused
the propellant to ignite.
Recommendations:
1) That burning should only take place in the early morning when it’s cool and the wind is
much calmer.
2) Extreme caution must be taken when moving and laying out loose bundles of propellant.
The friction caused by these movements must be minimized.
3) Using the same ground to do multi burns must be avoided if possible. If this is not possible
then water down the burn site prior to doing any consecutive burn operations.
4) Never turn your back on the propellant. Always keep observation on the main propellant
body and the burn train. That way any flare-ups will be seen early on, and an evacuation of
the site carried out before personnel are caught in the ensuing fire.
5) That [Demining group] / UN Radio room confirm the correct radio procedures in an
emergency situation and the requirements that each party has to comply with. UN Radio room
should test IRT lines at least once a week.

Summary:
In summary, the incident of July 3rd brings to light the dangers facing EOD/Demining teams
and individual members of those teams. While this incident was serious in its nature, it could
have been much worse. Persons must remain vigilant while carrying out clearance operations
and be aware of the surroundings, the environment and the condition of the items being
destroyed.
The cause of the accident on July 3rd could have been any one of the factors listed above or
a combination of all of them. And no one factor can be singled out as the sole reason this
incident happened.
An SOP will have to drafted then adopted and approved by the UNMAS in which a Render
Safe Procedure (RSP) is developed which takes into account the conditions of the
propellants, the weather and the burn pits to be used and the Wait Time (WT) between
individual burns in the same pit. And finally, the mass of propellant to be dealt with. The
quantities being dealt with in Iraq have never been encountered on this type of scale on any
other Clearance operation to date. Current EOD Burn Ops timings and amounts would be
very difficult to employ successfully. Teams would become bogged down in burn ops alone
with out even starting the actual UXO clearance op.
Radio procedures failed on several levels. Both, between the team members of [the Demining
group] and the UN Radio room. This problem is easily rectified. [The Demining group] and the
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UN Radio will conduct mutual training on procedures to be followed in case of an emergency.
These procedures will then be practiced at least once a month by holding a exercise over the
radio net. Coordination will be worked out between the [the Demining group] internationals
and the UN Radio I/C. The IRT phones system is to checked out at least once a week by the
UN Radio room personnel and confirm it’s operational.
Although the accident was a serious incident to both [the Demining group] and the EOD
/Demining operations and all teams in general. I don’t think any one factor or person can be
held accountable for what happened. But a combination of all of the above factors combined
together. EOD work by its very nature has risks that are inherent to it.
Signed: Demining group Location Manager, Basra, Iraq.
Conclusions:
1) The environment was a contributing factor. The hot weather and wind produced the right
conditions for static electricity. Where an errant spark could light the propellant prematurely.
2) The propellant has been exposed to the environmental extremes, making it unstable and
sensitive to the surrounding conditions and external forces such as friction and shock.
3) The ground being used for a previous burn operation that morning may have not had
sufficient time to cool. And when the sensitive propellant was placed on this ground, it caused
the propellant to ignite.
Recommendations:
1) That burning should only take place in the early morning when it’s cool and the wind is
much calmer.
2) Extreme caution must be taken when moving and laying out loose bundles of propellant.
The friction caused by these movements must be minimized.
3) Using the same ground to do multi burns must be avoided if possible. If this is not possible
then water down the burn site prior to doing any consecutive burn operations.
4) Never turn your back on the propellant. Always keep observation on the main propellant
body and the burn train. That way any flare-ups will be seen early on, and an evacuation of
the site carried out before personnel are caught in the ensuing fire.
5) That [Demining group] / UN Radio room confirm the correct radio procedures in an
emergency situation and the requirements that each party has to comply with. UN Radio room
should test IRT lines at least once a week.

Summary:
In summary, the incident of July 3rd brings to light the dangers facing EOD/Demining teams
and individual members of those teams. While this incident was serious in its nature, it could
have been much worse. Persons must remain vigilant while carrying out clearance operations
and be aware of the surroundings, the environment and the condition of the items being
destroyed.
The cause of the accident on July 3rd could have been any one of the factors listed above or
a combination of all of them. And no one factor can be singled out as the sole reason this
incident happened.
An SOP will have to drafted then adopted and approved by the UNMAS in which a Render
Safe Procedure (RSP) is developed which takes into account the conditions of the
propellants, the weather and the burn pits to be used and the Wait Time (WT) between
individual burns in the same pit. And finally, the mass of propellant to be dealt with. The
quantities being dealt with in Iraq have never been encountered on this type of scale on any
other Clearance operation to date. Current EOD Burn Ops timings and amounts would be
very difficult to employ successfully. Teams would become bogged down in burn ops alone
with out even starting the actual UXO clearance op.
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Radio procedures failed on several levels. Both, between the team members of [the Demining
group] and the UN Radio room. This problem is easily rectified. [The Demining group] and the
UN Radio will conduct mutual training on procedures to be followed in case of an emergency.
These procedures will then be practiced at least once a month by holding a exercise over the
radio net. Coordination will be worked out between the [the Demining group] internationals
and the UN Radio I/C. The IRT phones system is to checked out at least once a week by the
UN Radio room personnel and confirm it’s operational.
Although the accident was a serious incident to both [the Demining group] and the EOD
/Demining operations and all teams in general. I don’t think any one factor or person can be
held accountable for what happened. But a combination of all of the above factors combined
together. EOD work by its very nature has risks that are inherent to it.
Signed: Demining group Location Manager, Basra, Iraq.

Victim Report
Name: [Name removed]

Victim number: 569
Age: 37

Gender: Male

Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
minor Arms
minor Head
minor Neck
COMMENT: Propellant burns. See medical report.

Medical report
A full medical report from the British Military Hospital at Shaibe Airfield (near Basrah)
southern Iraq is held on record. The medial report gives the victim's date of birth as
14/08/1965. He was treated for "5% burns, largely partial thickness" caused by "artillery
propellant due to static explosion at approx 11 am".
Burns (1) Probably partial thickness from above to below elbow and down to wrists, ventral
aspects with some blisteroing, both forearms.
(2) Back of neck with some blisteriong. Probably partial thickness.
(3) Behind both ears and tips of pinnas R and L - possibly subdermal full thickness.
An addendum on the following day reported that he was kept in hospital overnight and slept
well. The medical expenses form was completed on the day following the accident, implying
discharge. He required "alternate daily dressings with flamazine to all areas until healed". He
was given 2-3 weeks off work to recover.
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The photograph below shows the extent of the victim’s injuries.

Statements
Statement 1
Accident Report 3rd July 2003: (Burning of propellant)
[Demining group] team was working on a site at Mowqa AL-Basrah cleaning out the
ammunition bunker. My self [Name excised 2] and [Name excised 1] were the two supervisors
on site.
Two propellant burns were conducted earlier that morning, about two hours apart. At about
10:50hr another propellant burn was to take place. During this time I was supervising inside
the bunker when one of the deminers called for me to come out. When I got outside I found
that the medics had left the support area to attend to [the Victim] who received burn wounds
from a propellant burn . I asked what happened and [the Victim]’s reply was “ it ignited while I
was doing the propellant trail “. He was then treated by the medical staff and taken to Basra
house. I then stopped work on the site. The gear was packed up and team retuned to Basra
house.
Signed
[Demining group] Team Leader

Statement 2
During the morning of July 3, 2003, whilst accompanying [Name excised 3] on a recce we
were required to visit a site that was being worked on by [Demining group] personnel. On
approaching the site we noticed a large fiery flash coming from the direction of the work site.
The distance from us to the flash sight was about 1km. Due to the radio traffic coming from
the site it was obvious something unusual had occurred.
On arrival at the site it was learnt from the on site team member that one of the International
Staff had suffered burns due to the explosion we had seen earlier. The casualty was
dispatched to [Demining group] HQ Basra by Mamba with the team medic.
Due to shortage of drivers on site. I was required to remain. This I did. The on site Team
Supervisor then continued with the clearance task. I remained at the site support area with
the [Demining group] team personnel in this area along with the second team medic.
Approximately ten minutes later after the team commenced work, it was brought to my
attention by the team medic that he did not have a Trauma Kit pack on sight, and felt that
work should cease. On hearing this I contacted [Name excised 3] by the radio and told him of
the medics concern. [Name excised 3] at this stage was en route back to Basra. [Name
excised 3] instructed me to inform [Name excised 2] to stop work. Immediately. The team was
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working in the bunker with [name excised 2]. On entering the bunker, I observed [name
excised 2] and crew stacking ordnance, approximately five minutes after delivering [the
Victim]’s message the team emerged from the bunker with [name excised 2]. They then
proceeded to clean up the work site for the day.
After loading the equipment we departed the site to return to [the Demining group] Basra
House.
Signed: [Name excised 3] No position recorded.

Statement 3
3rd July 2003
Time: 11:00
Location: Mowgo Al-Basara, [Demining group] Task Site.
Description: While approaching the work site, I saw a big fire ball from a distance. We
stopped the car and waited for the fire to disperse. We than advanced toward the
administration area. Unfortunately we discovered that [the Victim] was burned, but not very
much. We understand the cause was self ignition of the propellants. The happy side of this
was the speed of the National medics, reaching and treating [the Victim].
Treating [the Victim] the medics then moved [the Victim] back to the Basra Office.
Signed: [name removed]

Statement 4
Statement of Medical doctor 1
On July 3, 2003 while we were at our site in the military facility of Mowga Al-Basara doing
EOD work, I saw a flame of fire at about 10:50 a.m. And after that I heard the drivers calling
on the radio and saying “emergency”. Myself and [Medical Doctor 2] jumped into the
ambulance and hurried to the site of the accident. I saw [the Victim] in a Land Rover, when
we pulled up he came over to our ambulance. It was obvious to me he had been exposed to
the flame. I proceeded to calm him down and assessed his general status. Cutting his T-shirt I
then examined his burn areas. The burns did not seem serious to me and I started washing
them and performing 1st Aid for the burns.
[Name excised 3] arrived on site and we discussed the condition of [the Victim] with each
other. I told [Name excised 3] that he was not very seriously injured but that he’ll have some
pain. [Name excised 3] then asked [the Victim] about how he felt. [The Victim] replied he was
“ fine”, so [Name excised 3] told me to take [the Victim] to Basra Office. We immediately took
him there and I continued my care of the patient till we reached the office.
Once reaching the office I became very concerned about [the Victim]’s ears because of the
amount of burns on them. I told [Name excised 3] of my concern. [Name excised 3] then
talked to [Name excised], who started the process of evacuating [the Victim] to the British
Military Hospital (BMH). This we did, and [the Victim] was admitted to the BMH for treatment.
Signed: [Medical Doctor 1]

Statement 5
Statement of [Name excised 3]
Re Incident 3 July 2003.
As per my task plan for the day I was to visit the site where the team was conducting
operations to drop of scrap material.
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Upon pulling into the main gate of the old military complex I came across [Demining group]
survey vehicles that were also entering the area. At the same time I saw propellant burning off
in the distance, still about 1500m at this stage. I then heard some radio traffic involving
Mamba 01 and HF 555 (medic), it was not detailed and I assumed the team had gone into a
casevac exercise which had been planned for the day. I then pulled over and waved down the
Mine Tech teams. I informed them that we were conducting propellant burns and in which
direction. I also told them the team was carrying out casevac drills.
I then proceeded slowly into the site and tried to contact HF 557 and let him know I was
entering the area. When we finally established communications with each other he informed
that he needed a land rover and myself on site. I replied saying that I was two minutes away
and would be there shortly. I then had an idea that something had occurred.
Upon arriving HF 557 informed me that there had been an uncontrolled propellant burn and
that HF 558 had some minor injuries. I parked my land rover and went to the vehicle that HF
558 was in. I spoke to him and he informed me he was fine. I then spoke to the medical
personnel who had treated him and [Medical doctor 1] informed me that he had suffered
superficial burns and that he would be experiencing some pain. Taking into account the good
condition that HF 558 seemed to be in I informed [name excised] to return to the office with
him and then we would access him there. This proved to be a wrong decision on my part.
I then proceeded to unload my vehicle so I could catch up with the vehicle that was taking
HF558 back to the office. I left HF552 on site to assist the team with the vehicle move back to
Basra House. HF 552 shut down the site after my departure.
Upon my return to the office I again consulted with [Medical Doctor 1] who then informed that
upon further examination he was concern with burns to the ears of HF558, it also became
very evident that he was in a lot of pain. It was therefore a bad decision on my part to send
him to the office and in hindsight he should have been transported straight to the BMH.
A decision was made to send HF 558 to the BMH for further diagnoses. He was given pain
relief before the journey, and a cannula inserted in his left hand as a precaution. During this
period I went into the radio room at Basrah House and asked them to contact the BMH to
inform them of our arrival but stipulated that it was not an emergency. I got frustrated because
the radio operator could not understand my English and he did not seem to have an idea how
to go about contacting the British Military. I could not help but think that I was glad this was
not an emergency.
Upon arrival at the British camp we had very little difficulty getting in the gate and the hospital
staff took over the care of HF 558. I will be returning to medical facility with [Demining group]
medical personnel shortly to allow them to do follow up on the medical care and any
insurance requirements.
Signed: [Name excised 3], [Demining group] Supervisor
03/07/03 1345Hrs

Statement 6
On Thursday the 3rd July 2003, at about 10:15 a.m. While me and [Medical Doctor 1] were
resting after 10 minutes after doing a casevac drill to the team. I heard an explosion and
looked to it’s origin. And it was at the site the propellants are burned in our location, but
surprisingly the Landrover and Mamba cars were so near to the site that it made us worry.
And while we were asking ourselves what happened, I received a radio call from (the Mamba
driver) telling me that there is an emergency and we have to go with the ambulance, so
quickly we went (me and [Medical Doctor 1]) in the ambulance to the scene. Were we saw
[the Victim] coming toward us in the Landrover. We rapidly took him to our ambulance and
tried as rapidly as possible to assess his burns injuries which were involving his upper limbs,
scalp and ears and the back of his neck. We’ve done our 1st Aid management by applying
burn cream rapidly to the burned area after removing his T-shirt. And while [Medical Doctor 1]
was managing [the Victim], I went by his Landrover to bring the drug kit from the support area
of our location, where we were doing our casevac drill. On coming back with the drugs and
our METHANE sheets. I saw the ambulance moving away and I met [Name excised 3] and
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[name excised] walking back to my location telling me that [Name excised 3] gave his
decision to return [the Victim] back to the [Demining group] Basara office to get rest.
I returned back to our support area to find out that the deminers and [Name excised 2] are
going back to the location for continuing that day work. At that time I thought we are stopping
work because the Trauma kit and the ambulance went with [Medical Doctor 1] and [the
Victim]. I passed my concerns to [Name excised 2], but he did not pay attention to my worry.
So I carried my concerns to [Name excised], who called by radio the team leader and told
him. He told him to tell [Name excised 2] to shut down the location for that day.
We then went back to Basara office, on arrival we continued the management of [the Victim]
and because of his burns involving the ears, the decision was made to take him to the BMH
Shaeba Hosp. We took the patient (me and [Medical Doctor 1] and [Name excised 3]) to the
BMH, and the patient was handed to the British Doctors on call.
Signed: Medical Doctor 2

Analysis
Two very similar accidents involving some of the same personnel occurred within a week of
each other in the same location. [See accidents 426 and 429.]
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because the spontaneous
ignition of the propellant was not expected, and the Victim was operating in an approved way
at the time. However, the absence of written SOPs for proven methods of disposal was a
significant “Management control inadequacy”, which is given as the secondary cause. The
failure of the MAC to investigate was also a serious Management control inadequacy.
It also seems that the site continued working without a trauma kit until the medic complained.
Also, the emergency casevac radio procedures failed because the radio operator was not
appropriately trained. These failings are recorded under “Notes”.
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